"Constitution does not require complete separation of church and state" -Lynch v. Donnelly, 1984
Justice William Orville Douglas served the longest term on the bench in the Supreme Court's history -- 36 years, until his death JANUARY 19, 1980.
He was one of the eight Supreme Court Justices nominated by Franklin D. Roosevelt.
He previously taught law at Columbia Law School and Yale Law School, and served on the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission.
Justice William O. Douglas wrote the majority decision in the 1952 case of Zorach v. Clauson:
"The First Amendment, however, does not say that in every and all respects there shall be a separation of Church and State ...
Otherwise the state and religion would be aliens to each other -- hostile, suspicious, and even unfriendly ...
Municipalities would not be permitted to render police or fire protection to religious groups.
Policemen who helped parishioners into their places of worship would violate the Constitution.
Prayers in our legislative halls;
the appeals to the Almighty in the messages of the Chief Executive;
the proclamations making Thanksgiving Day a holiday;
'So Help Me God' in our courtroom oaths;
-- these and all other references to the Almighty that run through our laws, our public rituals, our ceremonies would be flouting the First Amendment.
A fastidious atheist or agnostic could even object to the supplication with which the Court opens each session: 'God save the United States and this Honorable Court ...'"
Justice Douglas continued:
"We are a religious people whose institutions presuppose a Supreme Being ... When the state encourages religious instruction ... it follows the best of our traditions.
For it then respects the religious nature of our people and accommodates the public service to their spiritual needs.
To hold that it may not would be to find in the Constitution a requirement that the government show a callous indifference to religious groups. That would be preferring those who believe in no religion over those who do believe ..."
Douglas concluded:
"We find no constitutional requirement which makes it necessary for government to be hostile to religion and to throw its weight against efforts to widen the effective scope of religious influence ...
We cannot read into the Bill of Rights such a philosophy of hostility to religion."
Chief Justice Warren E. Burger cited Justice Douglas' Zorach v. Clauson opinion in the 1984 decision of Lynch v Donnelly:
"The concept of a 'wall' of separation between church and state is a ... figure of speech ... but the metaphor itself is not a wholly accurate description of the practical aspects of the relationship that in fact exists between church and state.
The Constitution does not require complete separation of church and state; it affirmatively mandates accommodation, not merely tolerance, of all religions, and forbids hostility toward any.
Anything less would require the 'callous indifference' (Zorach v. Clauson), that was never intended by the Establishment Clause ...
Indeed, we have observed, such hostility would bring us into 'war with our national tradition as embodied in the First Amendment's guaranty of the free exercise of religion. (McCollum) ..."
Justice Stanley Reed wrote in his dissent of McCullum v Board of Education, 1948:
"Rule of law should not be drawn from a figure of speech."
Justice Potter Stewart wrote in his dissent of Engle v Vitale, 1962:
"The Court ... is not aided ... by the ... invocation of metaphors like the 'wall of separation,' a phrase nowhere to be found in the Constitution."
Justice William Rehnquist wrote in his dissent of Wallace v Jaffree, 1984:
"The 'wall of separation between church and State' is a metaphor based on bad history, a metaphor which has proved useless as a guide to judging. It should be frankly and explicitly abandoned.
It is impossible to build sound constitutional doctrine upon a mistaken understanding of Constitutional history ...
The establishment clause had been expressly freighted with Jefferson's misleading metaphor for nearly forty years ...
There is simply no historical foundation for the proposition that the framers intended to build a wall of separation ...
The recent court decisions are in no way based on either the language or intent of the framers ... But the greatest injury of the 'wall' notion is its mischievous diversion of judges from the actual intentions of the drafters of the Bill of Rights."
Justice William Orville Douglas served the longest term on the bench in the Supreme Court's history -- 36 years, until his death JANUARY 19, 1980.
He was one of the eight Supreme Court Justices nominated by Franklin D. Roosevelt.
He previously taught law at Columbia Law School and Yale Law School, and served on the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission.
Justice William O. Douglas wrote the majority decision in the 1952 case of Zorach v. Clauson:
"The First Amendment, however, does not say that in every and all respects there shall be a separation of Church and State ...
Otherwise the state and religion would be aliens to each other -- hostile, suspicious, and even unfriendly ...
Municipalities would not be permitted to render police or fire protection to religious groups.
Policemen who helped parishioners into their places of worship would violate the Constitution.
Prayers in our legislative halls;
the appeals to the Almighty in the messages of the Chief Executive;
the proclamations making Thanksgiving Day a holiday;
'So Help Me God' in our courtroom oaths;
-- these and all other references to the Almighty that run through our laws, our public rituals, our ceremonies would be flouting the First Amendment.
A fastidious atheist or agnostic could even object to the supplication with which the Court opens each session: 'God save the United States and this Honorable Court ...'"
Justice Douglas continued:
"We are a religious people whose institutions presuppose a Supreme Being ... When the state encourages religious instruction ... it follows the best of our traditions.
For it then respects the religious nature of our people and accommodates the public service to their spiritual needs.
To hold that it may not would be to find in the Constitution a requirement that the government show a callous indifference to religious groups. That would be preferring those who believe in no religion over those who do believe ..."
Douglas concluded:
"We find no constitutional requirement which makes it necessary for government to be hostile to religion and to throw its weight against efforts to widen the effective scope of religious influence ...
We cannot read into the Bill of Rights such a philosophy of hostility to religion."
Chief Justice Warren E. Burger cited Justice Douglas' Zorach v. Clauson opinion in the 1984 decision of Lynch v Donnelly:
"The concept of a 'wall' of separation between church and state is a ... figure of speech ... but the metaphor itself is not a wholly accurate description of the practical aspects of the relationship that in fact exists between church and state.
The Constitution does not require complete separation of church and state; it affirmatively mandates accommodation, not merely tolerance, of all religions, and forbids hostility toward any.
Anything less would require the 'callous indifference' (Zorach v. Clauson), that was never intended by the Establishment Clause ...
Indeed, we have observed, such hostility would bring us into 'war with our national tradition as embodied in the First Amendment's guaranty of the free exercise of religion. (McCollum) ..."
Justice Stanley Reed wrote in his dissent of McCullum v Board of Education, 1948:
"Rule of law should not be drawn from a figure of speech."
Justice Potter Stewart wrote in his dissent of Engle v Vitale, 1962:
"The Court ... is not aided ... by the ... invocation of metaphors like the 'wall of separation,' a phrase nowhere to be found in the Constitution."
Justice William Rehnquist wrote in his dissent of Wallace v Jaffree, 1984:
"The 'wall of separation between church and State' is a metaphor based on bad history, a metaphor which has proved useless as a guide to judging. It should be frankly and explicitly abandoned.
It is impossible to build sound constitutional doctrine upon a mistaken understanding of Constitutional history ...
The establishment clause had been expressly freighted with Jefferson's misleading metaphor for nearly forty years ...
There is simply no historical foundation for the proposition that the framers intended to build a wall of separation ...
The recent court decisions are in no way based on either the language or intent of the framers ... But the greatest injury of the 'wall' notion is its mischievous diversion of judges from the actual intentions of the drafters of the Bill of Rights."